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Mind, Identity and Language
 
The continuum of consciousness that begins with the first breath of an infant and develops into its individual identity and sense of self awareness is then referred to as the indivtdual "self-consciousness" (selfhood).  This "I" awareness or self awareness has attributes and purpose that are unique to that individual person.  The human mind is an individualistic essence of consciousness that has its own sentient characteristics. Physical DNA which reacts and adapts to environmental circumstances and influences are the blueprint of physical characteristics.  Mental and emotional characteristics of individual minds are influenced not only by environmental factors (parential, education, etc.) but by the instantiate numerical symbols representing the alphabetical sequence of letters of language that in turn represent natural categorical qualities of intelligence.  The enviromentally given proper names of the individual, whether first names, nick names, last names or surnames profoundly and subtley affect the mind as to thought patterns, and emotional expression instilled by the harmonious or perhaps dicordant combination of vowels and consonants that comprise those enviromentally given names (syntax of names) either singly or combined.  Just as a musical instrument can create relative harmonious or discordant notes or chords, the underlying cognitive informational sequence and pattern recognition processes in responding to and identifying an individual by name, can, over the passage of time create the qualitative and sentient enity referred to as individual mind.
 
Proper nouns...name. Pronouns name without identifying.  Referent proper names (rigid designators) assigned to the physical and mental referent personality (explicit designatee) by other human conscious entities attaches meaningful non-reducible numerically classified qualitative characteristics (number being a property of a set) to that particular concrete biophysical individual.
 
These environmental assigned and individually accepted rigid designators (proper names) convey the qualities of the forces of intelligence (abstract properties) that influence the mental phenomena referred to and cognitively recognized by that particular individual human entity.
 
The qualities of sophisticated human consciousness manipulated with the vehicles of universal sequential order as used in language symbols have, over time, a subtly but obvious effect on the expression of the characteristics of consciousness content of individual minds. Just as the keys struck on a piano create harmony or discord, assigned referent proper names (explicit rigid designators) will have unintended consequences of discord or harmony as to the relational qualities influencing the desires, expressions etc. of the referent individual. Seemingly meaningless non-descriptive proper names convey innate intentional meaning.
 
Beyond immediate sensory and motor activity, the fundamental 'forces of intelligence', over time, mold and influence mental identity, locus of mental perception, and qualitative (im)balance and (dis)harmony may be knowingly or unknowingly created or manipulated.
 
Balance, harmony, natural order, and apparent discord, chaos and randomness are all instantiations of mathematics; and universal basic abstract phenomenal mathematics (representing obscured intrinsic universal relational meaningful order) is the pathway to bridging the gap leading to an objective understanding of that part of human qualitative consciousness content defined as individualized mind.
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Identity (Quotation)

"To say that things are identical is to say that they are the same. “Identity” and “sameness” mean the same; their meanings are identical. However, they have more than one meaning. A distinction is customarily drawn between qualitative and numerical identity or sameness. Things with qualitative identity share properties, so things can be more or less qualitatively identical. Poodles and Great Danes are qualitatively identical because they share the property of being a dog, and such properties as go along with that, but two poodles will (very likely) have greater qualitative identity. Numerical identity requires absolute, or total, qualitative identity, and can only hold between a thing and itself. Its name implies the controversial view that it is the only identity relation in accordance with which we can properly count (or number) things: x and y are to be properly counted as one just in case they are numerically identical (Geach 1973)."Source: Noonan, Harold, "Identity", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2005 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
 
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Language of Thought Hypothesis (Quotation)

"Language of thought hypothesis (LOTH) is an hypothesis about the nature of thought and thinking with propositional content. As such, it may or may not be applicable to other aspects of mental life. Officially, it is silent about the nature of some mental phenomena such as experience, qualia, sensory processes, mental images, visual and auditory imagination, sensory memory, perceptual pattern-recognition capacities, dreaming, hallucinating, etc. To be sure, many Language of Thought (LOT) theorists hold views about these aspects of mental life that make it seem that they are also to be explained by something similar to Language of Thought  Hypothesis (LOTH)
 
For instance, Fodor (1983) seems to think that many modular input systems have their own LOT to the extent to which they can be explained in representational and computational terms. Indeed, many contemporary psychological models treat perceptual input systems in just these terms. There is indeed some evidence that this kind of treatment might be appropriate for many perceptual processes. But it is to be kept in mind that a system may employ representations and be computational without necessarily satisfying any or both of the clauses in (B) above in any full-fledged way. Just think of finite automata theory where there are plenty of examples of a computational process defined over states or symbols which lack full-blown syntactic and/or semantic structural complexity. Whether sensory or perceptual processes are to be treated within the framework of full-blown LOTH is again an open empirical question. It might be that the answer to this question is affirmative. If so, there may be more than one LOT realized in different subsystems or mechanisms in the mind/brain. So LOTH is not committed to there being a single representational system realized in the brain, nor is it committed to the claim that all mental representations are complex or language-like, nor would it be falsified if it turns out that most aspects of mental life other than the ones involving propositional attitudes don't require a LOT.
 
Similarly, there is strong evidence that the mind also exploits an image-like representational medium for certain kinds of mental tasks.  LOTH is non-committal about the existence of an image-like representational system for many mental tasks other than the ones involving propositional attitudes. But it is committed to the claim that propositional thought and thinking cannot be successfully accounted for in its entirety in purely imagistic terms. It claims that a combinatorial sentential syntax is necessary for propositional attitudes and a purely imagistic medium is not adequate for capturing that."Source:  Aydede, Murat, "The Language of Thought Hypothesis", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),